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Abstract
Several  recent papers have attempted  to identify the  identified despite the apparently good  performance  of
partial effects  of trade  integration and institutional  the instruments  in first-stage  regressions.  Consequently,
quality on  long-run growth using the geographical  they argue that the cross-country variation in institutions,
determinants  of trade and the historical determinants  of  trade, and their geographical  and historical determinants
institutions  as instruments. Dollar and Kraay show that  is not very informative about the partial effects of these
many of the specifications  in  these papers are weakly  variables on long-run growth.
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helpful comments1. Introduction
Two recent papers have proposed novel instruments and have used them to
separately identify strong causal effects of trade and institutions on economic
development.  Frankel and Romer (1999,  FR) show that the geographically determined
component of trade as a fraction of GDP exerts a strong positive effect on growth  in the
very long run, while Acemoglu,  Johnson and Robinson (2001,  AJR) show that the
historically determined  component of current institutional quality exerts strong effects on
development in a similar framework.
An open question, however,  concerns the partial effects of institutions and trade
on growth in the long  run.  Several very recent papers have investigated this question,
but come to strikingly different conclusions.  Alcala and Ciccone (2002, AC) estimate a
variety of regressions of GDP per worker on trade as a share of GDP and measures  of
institutional quality.  They instrument for these two variables using the FR instrument as
well as linguistic origins, and find that trade is quite significant, while institutional quality
is occasionally but not consistently significant.  Dollar and Kraay (2002, DK)  estimate a
specification very similar to that of AC.  In contrast with AC,  DK argue informally that the
cross-country variation in the data is uninformative about the relative contribution of
institutions and trade  Finally, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002, RST) estimate a
variety specifications similar to those of AC  and DK in an effort to sort out the
geographical, institutional,  and trade-related determinants of development.  In contrast
with AC and  OK, RST conclude that institutions matter while trade does not.'
The objective of this paper is to show that empirical specifications which seek to
isolate the partial effects of institutions and trade can suffer from serious identification
problems.  The issue, which we discussed informally in  our previous paper, is
straightforward.  In  many of the specifications in these papers, the historical and
geographical instruments  proposed in the previous literature tend to have good
1 In a related paper,  Easterly and  Levine (2002) attempt to disentangle the geographical  and
institutional determinants of development.  In a number of specifications they control for various
measures of policy, including trade  policy.  They generally find that institutions dominate
geography and trade.  Since their paper considers trade policy rather than trade itself, we do not
consider it further  here.explanatory power for both endogenous variables, institutions and trade.  Consequently,
the fitted values of institutions and trade from first-stage regressions are highly
correlated with each other, and these specifications are at best weakly identified, even
though first-stage regressions have apparently good explanatory power.  In short,
although the historical and geographical instruments for institutions and trade proposed
by AJR and FR perform well in their respective univariate applications, they are not
strong enough to identify the partial effects of these variables.
We document the  identification problem using the partial  R-squared diagnostic
measures suggested by Shea (1997),  and the minimum eigenvalue test of the null
hypothesis of weak instruments suggested  by Stock and Yogo (2001).  In most cases,
both diagnostic statistics as well as the formal tests verify the informal observation in DK
that these models are not very well identified.  Consequently,  inferences about the
structural parameters of interest, i.e. the causal effects of institutions and trade on long-
run growth, cannot reliably be based on conventional t-statistics.2 We therefore
compute confidence intervals for these structural coefficients of interest using three
methods suggested in the literature on inference with weak instruments:  the AR statistic
proposed by Anderson  and Rubin (1949),  the conditional likelihood ratio statistic
proposed by Moreira (2002), and the S-statistic proposed  by Startz, Zivot and  Nelson
(2001).  These methods which take into account the low strength of the instruments
produce substantially larger confidence intervals than those based on standard
asymptotic theory in the specifications we consider.  In many cases, confidence intervals
for the parameters of interest cover (nearly) the entire real line.  These results serve to
formalize the informal intuition in our previous paper that the cross-country variation in
trade,  institutions, and their historical and geographical determinants is not very
informative about their relative importance for growth in the long run.
Finally, in our previous paper we also investigated the relative contributions of
institutions and trade over shorter horizons  by looking at changes in decadal growth
rates over the past four decades.  We apply the same weak instrument diagnostics to
these specifications.  Although we find that dynamic regressions controlling only for
trade and initial income are well-identified, the regressions which add institutional quality
2 See Staiger and Stock (1997)  for a seminal  paper, and Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) for a
recent survey of weak instruments.
2are poorly  identified when institutional quality is taken as endogenous,  but are
reasonably well-identified  when institutional quality is treated as exogenous.
The empirical examples that we discuss in this paper are specific to the recent
debate on the relative importance of institutions and trade for long-run growth.  We think
however that our results have broader  implications for the cross-country empirical
growth  literature, which has only in recent years begun to take seriously the endogeneity
of many of the key determinants of growth.  Our results here highlight the more general
difficulty in finding exogenous and independent sources of variation required to identify
the partial effects of such determinants of growth.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review some of
the main  empirical specifications that have been advanced to show the effects of
institutions and trade on long-run growth.  In Section 3 we describe and implement
diagnostic tests for the presence of weak instruments,  and show that most of the
empirical  specifications we  consider in Section 2 are in fact weakly identified.  In Section
4 we describe and implement three approaches to inference with weak instruments,  and
show that existing estimates of the partial effects of institutions and trade are much  less
precisely estimated than conventional t-statistics would suggest.  In Section 5 we
examine the strength of the identification of the decadal regressions from our previous
paper.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Empirical  Background
All of the papers discussed above estimate variants on the following  linear
instrumental variables  regression:
*(1)  In(GDP  Per Capita),  =  j  0 +P,  Institutions, +P 2 .Trade,  +  3'Controls1 +ui
Cross-country differences in GDP per capita today primarily reflect differences in growth
over the very long run since a date in the distant past when initial incomes were  not very
different across counties.  Consequently, this.specification can be thought of as
capturing  the determinants of growth  in the very long run.  Institutions and trade are both
treated as endogenous, and are instrumented using their deep historical and
3geographical determinants.  Each of the papers discussed above differs somewhat in
the measures of institutions and trade used, the control variables included in the
regression,  and the choice of instruments.  Table 1 summarizes the key differences
across the main specifications of interest in each of these papers.
The top part of Tables 2 and 3 report some of the main results of these papers.
To conserve on space, we report only the coefficients on the main endogenous variables
of interest:  institutions, trade,  and their instruments in the first-stage regressions.  Table
2 reports selected results from DK, while Table 3 reports selected results from RST.  We
do not report results from AC as we were unable to obtain their dataset at the time of
writing.  As a benchmark, the first two columns of Table 2 present regressions from DK
in the spirit of the original AJR and FR papers, estimating the effects of institutions and
trade separately, without controlling for the other variable.  Specification 2.1  shows the
effects of institutions only, analogous to the basic specification of AJR.  The main
differences  with AJR is that DK use linguistic origins rather than settler mortality to
instrument for institutional quality, and use a different measure of institutional quality.
Nevertheless, the results are broadly similar to that of AJR.  As the OLS regressions
show, institutional quality is strongly positively correlated with per capita incomes.  The
IV  regressions show a statistically and economically significant effect of institutions on
per capita income, with a slope coefficient larger than the corresponding OLS estimate.
Specification 2.2 shows the analog of the main  FR specification.  Here there are again
only two differences with the original paper:  the trade/GDP ratio is measured at PPP,
and the only included exogenous variable is the logarithm  of population.  Again the
results are very similar to those of the original paper, with a large and significant effect of
trade on growth.  In  both specifications 2.1 and 2.2, the first-stage regressions of
institutions and trade on their respective instruments perform quite well, with comfortably
large F-statistics of 13.3 and 28.8.
Specification 2.3 reports the main DK result on the partial effects of institutions
and trade.  Both institutions and trade enter positively in the OLS regression, with t-
statistics greater than 2. However, in the IV regression only institutional quality has a t-
statistic greater than 2, while the coefficient on trade falls to near zero and the t-statistic
falls to 0.3.  In  our other paper, we showed  however that this apparent result on the
importance  of institutions relative to trade was quite fragile, and that both variables were
4insignificant once four influential observations were discarded.  Here however we focus
on this main  specification, and show more formally below that the apparent significance
of institutional quality vanishes once we take weak identification into account.
Table 3 presents the baseline RST specification, and three variants.  RST
regress  log per capita GDP on distance from the equator, the same institutional quality
variable as in DK, and trade as a fraction of GDP in  local currency units.3 In their
preferred  80-country specification, they use settler mortality from AJR and distance from
FR as instruments.  The first column of Table 3 replicates their basic specification.  To
conserve on space, we again suppress the coefficient on distance from the equator (and
all other included exogenous variables).  The IV estimate of the effect of institutions is
positive, large, and highly significant using  a conventional t-test.  In contrast, trade
enters negatively and insignificantly.
RST go on to provide a number of robustness checks on this basic variant.  A
subset of these are reported in the remaining columns of Table 3.  In specification 3.2,
they replace the local currency trade share with the PPP trade share in order to make
their results more  comparable with  DK and AC.  In specification 3.3 they return to local
currency trade shares,  but add measures of domestic market size (the  logarithms of
area and population) in order to make their results more comparable with the original  FR
paper which included these variables.  In specification 3.4 we report one of several
specifications produced  by RST including a variety of other variables capturing different
channels through which geography might matter for development.  We focus on a cluster
of three variables they identify as jointly significant, consisting of land area in the tropics,
number of frost-days per year, and the incidence of malaria.  In each of these
robustness checks, they find that institutions enter the IV specification positively and with
3In their paper, RST argue that this is preferable  to using PPP-adjusted trade shares as do AC
and DK.  The sketch a simple model in which an increase in productivity which raises the relative
price of non-tradeables relative to the benchmark country will also raise the  PPP-adjusted trade
ratio.  This is because the PPP-adjusted GDP will fall to reflect the higher price of non-tradeables.
Since the increase in productivity raises income, this can introduce a spurious correlation
between income and the PPP-trade share.  While the choice of denominator for the trade ratio is
not the focus of this paper, we note in passing that we are not entirely convinced by this
argument.  First, it as long as these other sources of productivity differences are uncorrelated with
the FR instrument, this potential bias will not matter for the IV coefficient estimates.  Second, at a
more intuitive level,  if we want to capture the size of the traded sector relative to overall economic
activity, it seems natural to use an internationally-comparable measure  of overall economic
activity in constructing trade shares.
5t-statistics in excess of two.  In contrast, trade enters negatively in three of the four
specifications, and in all cases the t-statistics are well below 2.  Based on these findings,
as well as the basic DK finding in specification 2.3, they conclude in the title of their
paper that "institutions rule".  Below we aregue that these results could be interpreted
more cautiously once we take the strength of the identification into account.
3.  Are the Partial Effects of Institutions and Trade Identified?
The key question in this paper is the extent to which the empirical strategy of the
papers discussed in the previous section is a good one for capturing the partial effects of
institutions and trade on growth  in the very long run.  Our focus here is on one
shortcoming  of this approach - that existing instruments at best only weakly identify the
structural parameters of interest.  In order to review the tools on which we base this
conclusion, some further notation is useful.  The structural model in Equation (1) can be
written in the usual matrix notation as
(2)  y = Xp + u
where y is an nxl vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is an nxk matrix of
endogenous regressors, 1 is a kxl vector of structural coefficients, and u is an nxl
vector of disturbances.4 Let Z represent an nxq matrix of instruments.  Then the reduced
form consists of the following k+1  regressions of y and the columns of X on Z:
(3)  y=Ze+v
X=ZX+e
where 0  is an qxl vector and r  is a qxk matrix of reduced form coefficients, and v and e
are nxl  and nxk matrices of reduced-form  disturbances.  Let a and E denote the variance
of vj and the covariance matrix of ej respectively, and let Q denote the covariance matrix
of (v, e,')'.
4 In  what follows we suppress the additional exogenous control variables in the regression, by
interpreting y, X, and the instruments as the residuals from a regression of these variables on the
included exogenous  control variables.
6In order for the historical and geographical variables in Z to be valid instruments,
they need to be independent of u, which we assume to be the case, i.e.  E[Z'u]=O.  In
order for the structural parameters p to be identified, the two textbook order and rank
conditions must also be satisfied, i.e. the number of instruments  is greater than the
number of endogenous variables (q>k), and the matrix r  must be full rank (rank(r)=q).
Using this notation, the instrumental variables (IV) estimator of 3 is
= (X'Pz X)-' X'Pz y  where  Pz  - Z(Z'Z)-'Z  for any matrix Z.
A rapidly-growing recent literature on weak instruments has pointed out that the
validity of the usual approximation that  ,IV  is normally distributed in finite samples
depends crucially on the strength of the instruments.  In the case of only one
endogenous variable, the instruments are weak if they jointly have poor explanatory
power for the endogenous variable in the reduced-form  equation for X.  Nelson and
Startz (1990),  Staiger and Stock (1997) show that when the instruments are weak in this
sense,  the IV estimator is biased towards the mean of the OLS estimator, and is not
normally distributed.  Thus inferences about the structural parameters based on  usual t-
tests can be highly misleading.
When there are multiple endogenous variables, and so more than one first-stage
regression,  it is less obvious how to gauge the strength of the instruments  and the
quality of the normal approximation.  An important point, however, is that it is not
sufficient for the F-statistics in the individual first-stage regressions to be large.5
Shea (1997)  has proposed a simple diagnostic statistic for determining the
strength of instruments when there are multiple endogenous variables.  If X, and X2 are
two endogenous variables, then the instruments are strong if the component of the fitted
value of X, from the first-stage regressions that is orthogonal to the fitted value of X2 is
highly correlated with the component of X, that is orthogonal to X2. In the case of a
single endogenous variable, this criterion is simply the R-squared from the first-stage
5  Shea (1997)  gives a simple example.  In  the case of two instruments Z, and Z2 for the two
endogenous variables, X, and X2, if ZI  is is a good predictor of X, and of X2, but Z2 iS
uncorrelated with both endogenous variables, then the first-stage F-statistics will be large but the
model will not be identified since there is in effect only one instrument for the two endogenous
variables.
7regression.  While this statistic is intuitive and easily calculated, results on its distribution
are not provided in Shea (1997) and so this statistic does not lend itself well to formal
tests of the null hypothesis of weak instruments.
More generally, Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) point out that the validity of the
1  1
normal approximation depends on the concentration matrix  ^1  =  y  2']F'Z'Zr  2  being
large in the sense of the smallest eigenvalue of this matrix being large.  Note that the
concentration  matrix can be small for a variety of reasons.  All instruments could be
nearly uncorrelated with the endogenous variables, i.e. all the elements of F are small
relative to the variances of the errorterms in the first-stage regressions.  The
instruments could also be very highly correlated with each other so that Z'Z is not full
rank, i.e. there are essentially fewer instruments than endogenous variables.  Finally
concentration matrix could also be small if the rank condition for identification fails, i.e. F.
is not full rank.  This can occur if, as is the case in some of the applications considered
here, each of the instruments has strong explanatory power for both endogenous
variables.
Stock and Yogo (2001)  develop a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments
are weak based on this idea.  In  particular, they provide critical values for a test of the
null hypothesis of weak instruments  based on the minimum eigenvalue of
F =  7
1/ 2vXvPz,71/2,  where  i  = X'(l - Pz )X/(n - q)  is a consistent estimate of the
covariance matrix of errors from the first-stage regressions.6 In the version of the test
we implement below, the researcher specifies a null hypothesis that the instruments  are
weak if the maximum  size distortion of Wald tests about parameters of interest under the
null of weak instruments is equal to some pre-specified value.  Stock and Yogo (2001)
then tabulate the critical values of the minimum eigenvalue of G for which the null of
weak instruments should be rejected.
6 When the instruments are weak, they show that  E[G] =  2 / q + I.  One drawback of this test in
our current application is that it is derived under the assumption of iid homoskedastic error terms
in the structural equation.  The same is true for the approaches to inference discussed below.
We are unaware of tests for weak instruments which relax this assumption, and it is difficult to say
how important  deviations from this assumption are for the results we obtain.
8With these tools in hand we can investigate the strength of the instruments in the
specifications in  Tables 2 and 3. Consider first the core DK specification in regression
2.3.  In  the first-stage regressions, we see that the linguistic origin variables and the FR
instrument  are highly significant predictors of both endogenous variables.  In  our
previous paper we noted that this implied a very high correlation between the fitted
values of institutions and trade in the second-stage regression, which made the IV
estimates highly sensitive to a few influential observations.  Table 2 reports that this
correlation of fitted values from the first-stage regression is 0.74, indicating strong
collinearity in the second-stage regression.  From  this we concluded informally that the
cross-sectional variation in institutions, trade and incomes was  not very informative
about the partial effects of the former two on the latter.
The weak instrument diagnostics discussed in the previous subjection help us to
make this point more precisely.  Consider first the Shea (1997) partial  R-squared
statistics.  We find in our specification that these statistics are very small at only 0.02
and 0.04 respectively.  In  contrast, the R-squareds from the first-stage regressions in the
first two univariate specifications in Table 2 were 0.14 and 0.29.  This provides a first
indication of the idea that while linguistic origin and distance are reasonable instruments
when the effects of institutions and trade are estimated separately, they are quite poor
instruments when the effects of the two are considered jointly.
The middle panel of Table 2 also reports the eigenvalues of the matrix of
estimated coefficients in the first-stage regression,  F,  as well as the eigenvalues of G.
The first observation here is that the ratio of the largest to the smallest eigenvalues of r,
i.e. the condition number of r,  is nearly 100 and the smallest eigenvalue is small at
0.025.  This indicates that the matrix of estimated coefficients in the first-stage
regression is very close to not being of full rank, contributing to weak identification of the
parameters of interest.  The smallest eigenvalue of G is 1.36.  To interpret this value,
suppose we were to define the set of weak instruments very narrowly as only those
instruments that would lead to size distortions of 25% or more (i.e. the size of a nominal
5% test about a parameter of interest were actually 25%), we would not reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments in this application are weak according to this stringent
criterion, since the critical value provided  by Stock and Yogo is 5.75.
9The middle panel of Table 3 also reports the same diagnostic statistics for
selected specifications from RST.  In all of these specifications,  the first-stage
regressions perform well:  seven of the eight first-stage  F-statistics are larger than  10,
and even the smallest is still respectable at 8. However,  these F-statistics are not
sufficient to diagnose the strength of the instruments.  Closer inspection of the first-stage
regressions shows the same tell-tale signs of potential problems as in the DK
specification in  Table 2.  In  seven of the eight first-stage regressions in Table 3, the
instrument for institutions (settler mortality) has strong explanatory power for both
institutions and trade,  while the instrument for trade (the FR constructed trade share)  is a
significant predictor of both institutions and trade at the 5%  level in seven of the eight
specifications as well.
Table 3 also presents the same diagnostic statistics on instrument quality as in
Table 2.  The Shea partial R-squared statistics are small in most cases, although not as
extremely so as in the basic DK specification.  In  four of the eight first-stage regressions,
the partial R-squareds are less than 0.1, and in seven out of eight they are less than 0.2.
More formally, in each of the four specifications, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are weak.  However, the size of the set of weak instruments under the
null is different in the four specifications.  In  specifications 2 and 4, the minimum
eigenvalues of G are 1.95 and 3.24, and we cannot reject even the most conservative
set of weak instruments tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2001).  In specifications 1 and 3,
the minimum eigenvalues of G are 6.2 and 6.8, and we cannot reject the null that the
instruments fall in the larger set of weak instruments that would lead to size distortions of
at least 5 percent,  i.e. a test with  nominal size of 5%  would in fact have a true size of
10%.
These results suggest that there are reasons to question inferences about the
importance of trade and institutions based on conventional t-statistics in the main
specifications considered  by RST as well.  In  the next section of the paper we discuss
approaches to inference that are valid even when the instruments are weak, and show
that the confidence intervals for the parameters of interest are much larger than simple t-
statistics would suggest.
104  How Large are the Partial Effects of Institutions and Trade?
In  this section we briefly describe three approaches to constructing valid
confidence intervals when instruments are weak.  The first is based  on the Anderson-
Rubin statistic:
(4)  AR(Po )-  (y - X 0)'Pz  (y - Xp0)/ q
(y - XPO )'(1 - PZ )(y - Xpo )/(n - q)
which was first proposed  by Anderson  and Rubin (1949).  Under very general conditions,
including for any arbitrary concentration matrix ,u,  Staiger and Stock (1997)  show that q
times the AR statistic converges in distribution to a  % 2(q) random variable.  Since the
asymptotic distribution of the AR statistic does not depend on any nuisance parameters
even when the instruments are arbitrarily weak, it is pivotal and can be used for
inference.  Wang and Zivot (1998) suggest the use of this result to form valid (1-a).100%
confidence sets for the elements of 3 by 'inverting"  this statistic, i.e.  by finding the set of
values of Po such that  AR(po3)  s  ￿  )  where  x2 (q)  denotes the (1-ca).100  percentile of
qa
a  x2(q)  distribution.  In  the case of two endogenous variables, the joint confidence sets
for the two elements of ,B  can take a variety of shapes.  Confidence intervals for the
individual elements of 1 can be obtained by projecting these joint confidence sets on the
appropriate axes.7
Figure 1 shows an example  of two such 95%  confidence sets, and the
associated confidence intervals.  The top panel shows the case where the  95%
confidence set is the area inside an ellipse, corresponding to the coefficients on
institutions and trade in RST specification 3.1.  The confidence intervals for the
coefficients on trade and institutions are obtained by projecting the height and the width
of the ellipse on the corresponding  axes.  The bottom panel shows a case where the
95%  confidence set is the area inside a hyperbola, corresponding to the DK specification
7Kleibergen  (2002)  develops an altemative test which corrects the deficiency of the AR statistic
which is  that it has low power when the number of instruments is  large.  In  our applications with at
most three instruments this is  not a  concern, and inferences based on Kleibergen's K-statistic are
almost identical to those based on the AR statistic.
112.3.  Projecting this on the two axes shows that the 95%  confidence intervals-for the
coefficients on institutions and trade are the entire real line.  That is,  the data is so
uninformative due to weak identification that it is consistent with any value of these
parameters.  We will discuss the specific cases to which these confidence sets apply
below when we present the empirical results in more detail.
Moreira (2002) has proposed a conditional likelihood ratio statistic as the basis
for inference when instruments are weak.  Moreira observes that it is possible to write
the usual likelihood ratio statistic for the linear IV model  as a function of two orthogonal
sufficient statistics:  S = Z'Ybo  and T = Z'YQ-'Ao  where  Y -(y,X),  bo  (1,  -Po')',  and
AO  = (Po,  Ik).  His key observation is that since S is a function only of data and the
parameters  of interest, the likelihood ratio statistic conditional on the value of T observed
in the data can be used to make inferences about the parameters of interest.  In
particular, Moreira shows that the likelihood ratio statistic can be written as:
(5)  LR = S'S  Xmin
where  S =  (Z'Z)-'S(bo'Qbo)-112 and T  (Z'ZY1T(AO'Q-1Aoy)'
2 are the standardized
versions of S and T, and  Xmin  denotes the smallest eigenvalue of (S,T)'  (s, T).
Confidence intervals for ,B  can be constructed by inverting this statistic in the same way
as the AR statistic.  The LR statistic does not have a known distribution on which to base
critical values.  However, Moreira (2002) suggests a strategy for simulating this
distribution empirically to obtain the necessary critical values, which we adopt here.8
The final approach to inference with weak instruments is based on the S-statistic
proposed by Startz,  Nelson and Zivot (2001).  This statistic is defined as:
(6)  S2  = Tj(X)
2 /( aT'(X)  V[XJ  aT8'PG)
ax  ax 
8 In  particular, since  S  follows a standard normal  distribution, the distribution of LR conditional on
the value of  T  observed  in the data can be simulated by repeatedly taking draws from the
distribution of S  and evaluating LR at the observed value of T.
12where  X is a vector containing all of the reduced-form  coefficient estimates,
,f()  pi Iv  /V,IV  is the IV estimate of the ij element of 13; and p1  o  is its value
under the null hypothesis.  The  S-statistic is the square of the standardized value of
T,(X),  and rejects  the null when it is large.  To provide an intuition for this statistic,
Startz, Nelson and Zivot (2001 ) note that the numerator of  , (x) is the distance between
the IV estimate and  its hypothesized value.  The denominator is the middle part of the
concentration matrix,  and is small when identification is weak.  Thus the S-statistic will
reject the null if the coefficient estimate is far from the null, or if identification is weak.
Startz, Nelson and Zivot (2001)  show that the S statistic converges to a  X2(1)
random variable when the instruments  are good, and is bounded above by a
x2(q - k + 1) random  variable when the instruments are weak.  To construct confidence
intervals for the ith element of 13,  we need only find the set of hypothesized null values
for which the S-statistic is less than the appropriate critical value.  Figure 2 illustrates
one such confidence set, for the coefficient on institutions in the RST specification 2.1.
Note that the confidence set need not be the usual closed interval,  but can consist of two
disconnected intervals.  A further convenient property of this approach to inference is
that it is possible to construct confidence intervals for a single parameter directly, and  -
that projection methods needed for the AR and  LR statistic are not required  in this case.
The bottom  panels of Tables 2 and 3 present confidence intervals constructed
using these three approaches to inference that are robust to weak instruments.  For
reference  purposes, we first report 95% confidence intervals for the coefficients on
institutions and trade based on the usual Wald statistics, i.e. the estimated coefficient
plus or minus two estimated standard  errors.  In  the remaining rows we report the 95%
confidence intervals based  on the AR,  LR, and S-statistics, respectively.
Consider first the main  DK specification in the third column of Table 1.
Conventional confidence intervals for the coefficients on institutions and trade are (0.57,
1.95) and (-1.00,  1.35)  respectively, suggesting a positive and significant effect of
institutions and an insignificant effect of trade.  Confidence  intervals that are robust to
13weak instruments lead to quite different conclusions.  All three statistics give confidence
intervals that consist of the entire real line for both the coefficients on institutions and on
trade.  This finding formalizes the informal observation in our previous paper that the
cross-country variation in institutions, trade, and their geographical and historical
determinants  is not sufficiently informative to pin down the partial  effects on growth of
either of these endogenous variables.
The RST results are  less stark, but still show that inferences based on the usual
t-statistics can be misleading.  In the basic RST specification 3.1,  the 95% confidence
intervals for institutions based on the AR and LR statistics are much wider than those
based on the usual Wald statistic, but still contain only positive values.The confidence
interval for institutions based on the S-statistic consists of two disjoint intervals, (-0,  -
1.77) and  (1.67,  o).  The former two tests suggest that the partial effect of institutions is
positive, but much  less tightly estimated than a conventional t-test would suggest.  The
third  statistic indicates that the coefficient on institutions is in fact very imprecisely
estimated,  in that the data are consistent with a wide range of both positive and negative
values for this coefficient. The intervals for the coefficient on trade based on the AR, LR
and S-statistics are also much larger that those based on conventional t-statistics, but
mostly tend to include negative values.  Overall, the substantially-larger confidence
intervals based on weak instrument asymptotics suggest that the partial effects of
institutions and trade are not very tightly estimated.
The remaining specifications consider some of the robustness checks in RST.
First,  RST argue that their finding on the relative importance of trade is robust to using
PPP trade shares to measure trade.  The results in specification 3.2 suggest that this
equation  is also weakly identified.  In the bottom panel of Table 3 we see that the AR,  LR
and S-statistics all produce very large confidence intervals in the form of two disjoint sets
which exclude only what might be thought of as a priori reasonable values for these
parameters in the general vicinity of the OLS estimates.  The results of this specification
are therefore  more similar to those in the basic DK finding, in which the partial effects of
institutions and trade are essentially unidentified.  The same is true in specification 3.4
with additional geographical  control variables.  The  correct 95% confidence intervals
span  nearly the entire real line,  indicating that the data are consistent with virtually any
partial effect of institutions and trade.  In specification  2.3 the AR and LR statistics give
14confidence intervals that are similar (but substantially wider) to conventional ones, while
those based on the S-statistic encompass a very large range of parameter values.
To sum up, we have seen that the basic DK conclusion that the cross-sectional
data in their specification is uninformative about the partial effects of institutions and
trade is supported  by the more formal weak instrument asymptotic approximations used
here.  The same techniques also suggest that the RST findings on the relative
importance  of institutions may be less robust than meets the eye.  In  their specifications
using PPP trade shares and adding additional geographical controls, the data appears
consistent with virtually any values of the parameters of interest, due to the weak
identification of these equations.  In  their basic specification, the different approaches to
inference lead to different precise conclusions.  Qualitatively however they all lead to
much larger confidence intervals than those based  on t-statistics, especially in the case
of the S-statistic.
5.  Decadal  Regression Results
How might we proceed from the negative findings above that the partial effects of
institutions and trade are not identified in cross-country regressions of levels of per
capita GDP on instrumented  institutions and trade?  One possibility which we explored in
our previous paper was to instead look at decadal changes in growth, trade and
institutional quality in the hopes that the partial effects of the latter two variables would
be better identified in this framework  relying on internal  instruments.  Of course,  a
drawback of this approach is that by construction  it cannot pick up the very long-run
effects of institutions and trade emphasized in the levels regressions above.  Moreover,
while we showed that there is non-trivial variation in measures of trade and institutional
quality even at decadal frequencies, we are  less sure how informative this variation is
about true unobserved changes in these variables.  In  our previous paper we found that
changes in trade volumes were a significant predictor of changes in decadal growth
rates.  However, the effects of changes  in five measures of institutional quality on
changes in growth were very imprecisely estimated  and rarely statistically significant
across specifications.
15In  this section we deploy the tools descriped above to verify the strength of the
instruments in the decadal regressions of our previous paper.  We began with the
following standard cross-country growth regression:
(7)  YCt  =Po + P1  YC,t-k + P2'Xct +C  + Yt + VCt
where Yct  is log-level of per capita GDP in country c at time t, YC,t-k iS  its lag k years ago
(k=1 0 years in our application using decadal data) and Xc, is a set of control variables
which are measured as averages over the decade between t-k and t. We will consider
trade volumes and measures of institutional quality among the variables in X.
Subtracting lagged income from both sides of the equation gives the more  conventional
formulation  in which the dependent variable is growth,  regressed on initial income and a
set of control variables.  The disturbance term in the regression consists of an
unobserved country effect that is constant over time,  jc, an unobserved period effect
that is common across countries, -yt, and a component that varies across  both countries
and years which we assume to be uncorrelated over time,  vct.
We adopted the approach of Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), which is to
estimate equation (7) in differences,  using appropriate lags of the right-hand  side
variables as instruments.  In particular, we estimate the following regression:
(8)  yct  yc,t  =  (Yc,t-k  Yc,t-2k)+p2(Xct -Xc,t-k)+(Yt  Yt-*)+(Vct  VC,t-k)
This is nothing more than a regression of growth on lagged growth,  and on changes in
the set of explanatory variables.  Or, subtracting  lagged growth from both sides of the
equation, we  have changes in growth from one decade to the next as a function of initial
growth and changes in the explanatory variables.  Our identifying assumption is that
while trade volumes and institutional quality may be correlated with the
contemporaneous and lagged shocks to GDP growth  (E[Xdtvc,..t-]#0 for s2O), they are
uncorrelated with future shocks to GDP growth,  (E[(XYdv,,t+]=O for s>0).  We therefore
instrument for lagged growth using the log-level of per capita income at the beginning of
decade t-2k, and we instrument for the changes in trade and institutional quality using
their levels at the beginning of decade t-k.
16The first column of Table 4 reports the results of this specification when X
contains only the share of trade in GDP.  The OLS and IV estimates replicate those in
our previous paper.  We find a positive effect of trade on growth at this decadal
frequency, with a coefficient that is economically sensible and has a t-statistic greater
than 2. In  the first-stage regressions, we find that while only initial income is a significant
predictor of growth,  both initial income and initial trade are significant predictors of trade.
This suggests some  concerns about the strength of the identification.  The diagnostic
statistics for the presence of weak instruments paint a somewhat mixed  picture as well.
The Shea partial  R-squared for growth is very small, while the partial R-squared for trade
is a respectable 0.25.  On the other hand, the Stock-Yogo test statistic for the null of
weak instruments is large enough that we can reject the null.  The bottom panel reports
conventional Wald-based confidence intervals as well as intervals based on the S-
statistic.9 While the confidence interval for the coefficient on initial income is very large,
the confidence interval for the coefficient on trade is essentially the same as that based
on the usual Wald statistic.  This gives us some confidence in the robustness of this
basic finding on the effects of trade on growth at decadal frequencies, even though the
coefficient on initial income appears to be less well identified.
The middle panel of Table 4 reports results adding one of the five time-varying
measures of institutional quality we  considered in our previous paper.  Following Clague,
Keefer, Knack and Olson (1999) we proxy for the strength of property rights protection
using what they refer to as "contract-intensive money", i.e. the share of currency in
circulation held inside the banking system.  In  the middle panel of Table 4, we enter this
variable and treat it as endogenous.  The top part of the table again replicates the results
of our previous paper.  We find that the coefficient on trade does not change very much
relative to the previous case, while the measure of institutional quality enters negatively
with a very large standard  error.  However,  the diagnostic statistics for the presence of
weak instruments strongly point to identification problems in this specification.  The Shea
partial  R-squared statistics are tiny, as is the minimum eigenvalue of the concentration
matrix.  Not surprisingly, in this case confidence intervals based on the S-statistic cover
9  In this section we report only the confidence intervals based on the S-statistic because of its
convenient property that projection methods are not required.  This is  most useful in  the middle
specification of Table 4  where we have three  endogenous variables, and ensures that the results
are comparable across these three specifications.
17the entire real line, suggesting that this specification is entirely uninformative about all of
the parameters of interest.
The  reason for the poor performance of the IV estimator is however somewhat
different from the levels regressions discussed before.  In  the levels regressions the
problem was that the instruments for trade also explained institutional quality while the
instruments for institutional quality also predicted trade well.  This is not the case here.
In our previous paper we noted that initial levels of trade predict subsequent changes in
trade but not changes in institutions.  Conversely  initial levels of institutions predict
changes in institutions but not changes in trade.  However,  the problem here is that initial
institutions also predicts the endogenous change in initial income, while initial levels of
per capita income that are supposed to instrument for the change  in initial income also
explain changes in trade and changes in institutions.  This is why the identification of this
specification breaks down.'°
We obtain rather more encouraging results when we treat institutions as
exogenous.  In  our previous paper we noted that the large estimated standard errors on
the coefficient on institutional quality in the dynamic regressions might be due to weak
instruments.  We then also discussed results in which we treated institutions as
exogenous, which if anything were likely to exaggerate the effects of institutions on
growth.  In  these specifications we continued to fail to find a significant impact of
institutions on growth, while trade continued to enter positively and significantly.  In the
final panel of Table 4 we revisit this altemative specification.  The results are quite
similar to those in  the first panel where institutional quality was omitted entirely.  The
main difference now however is that the Stock-Yogo test favours the null hypothesis of
weak instruments.  Closer inspection of the first-stage regressions suggests that this
may be because initial levels of income are predicting both lagged growth and changes
in trade.  When we compute appropriate confidence intervals using the S-statistic, we
1'  RST argue that the significance of trade in  the decadal regressions in  DK is  not robust to the
inclusion of selected regional dummies and their interactions with decadal dummies.  For
example, for the specification using contract-intensive  money as a  proxy for institutional quality,
when these variables are estimated,  nothing is  significant in  the IV  regression.  In  light of the
results above, this is  perhaps not very surprising.  Since these additional exogenous variables are
likely to be good predictors of all three endogenous variables, this is  likely to further weaken the
performance of the instruments.  Moreover, given that these additional dummy variables are not
significant in  this specification, we are not sure that it is  a good strategy to include them and
undermine any hopes of identification.
18find once.again that the coefficient on initial income is not very precisely estimated.
Nevertheless we do find that the coefficient on trade is fairly precisely estimated,  with a
confidence interval very similar to that based on a conventional Wald test.
Overall these results suggest that it is also difficult to identify the partial causal
effects of institutions on growth in this shorter-run framework.  We do not appear to have
sufficiently informative variation in the decadal data to identify the partial effects of
institutions and trade treating  both as endogenous.  However,  the specification which
includes institutions but treats this variable as exogenous still serves a useful purpose,
since it helps to control for a spurious correlation of changes in trade with changes in
institutional quality, even if we cannot properly identify the partial effects of the latter.
6. Conclusions
In  this paper we have argued that existing attempts to isolate the partial effects of
institutions and trade on growth in the long run suffer from serious identification
problems.  The reason for this is simple -- existing historical and geographical
instruments in the literature tend to have strong predictive power for both institutions and
trade.  As a result, these specifications are only weakly identified, despite the apparent
good performance of first-stage regressions.
How do we move forward from such a negative result?  One possibility is to rely
more on the time-series variation  in institutions, trade and growth, in the hopes that
internal instruments will be less weak than in the cross-sectional applications we have
described.  This is the approach we followed in our previous paper.  However, this
approach appears to yield mixed results regarding the strength of the instruments.  If we
treat institutions as exogenous, we are at least able to uncover a significant partial
association between trade and growth which survives the inclusion of a variety of proxies
for institutional quality.  However, if we allow institutions to be endogenous,  we find that
the model is too weakly identified to be able to sharply estimate any of the parameters  of
interest.
Clearly simple cross-country linear instrumental  variables regressions,  either in
levels or in decadal differences, cannot provide  definitive answers about questions as
19complex as the interacting roles of institutions and trade for growth.  At best this
approach can summarize interesting  partial correlations in the data while at least
partially controlling for obvious endogeneity problems.  Combining this approach with
more  microeconometric evidence,  case studies, and descriptions of historical episodes
is likely to constitute fruifful research agenda.  In  the meantime,  the empirical examples
we provide here illustrate a broader problem in the cross-country empirical growth
literature, which only in recent years has begun to take serious the problem of
endogeneity of many of the key determinants of growth.  Finding compelling instruments
for these endogenous variables is difficult to begin with.  If in  addition we are interested
in sorting out the partial effects of multiple endogenous determinants of growth, the
search for instruments is further complicated by the need to find exogenous and
independent sources of variation in order to identify partial effects of interest.
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22Table I -- Summary of Estimates of Effects of Institutions and Trade on Growth
Paper  Dependent Varable  Institutions Variable  Trade Variable  Instruments  Induded  Exogenous Vanables
Frankel and Romer (1999),  Table  Real GDP  Per Capita  Excluded  Trade/GDP  in current Trade predicted by gravity  Area, Population
3, Column 2  at PPP,  1985  local currency units  model
Acemoglu, Johnson and  Robinson  Real  GDP Per Capita  Intemational Country  Excluded  Settler mortality  None, but several other
(2001),  Table 4,  Column 1  at PPP,  1995  Risk Guide  specifications indude a number
of other exogenous control
vanables
Alcala and Ciccone (2002), Table  Real GDP Per  Intemational Country  Trade/GDP  at PPP  Population,  log(Population),  log(Area),  regional dummies,
6, Column 3  Worker at PPP,  1985  Risk Guide  Area, Trade predicted by  distance from equator
gravity model,  log(Trade
predicted  by gravity model),
fraction of population
speaking English,  fraction of
population speaking major
European language
Dollar and Kraay (2002), Table 1,  Real GDP Per Capita  Rule of Law from  Trade/GDP  at PPP  Trade predicted by gravity  log(Population)
Column 6  at PPP,  1995  Kaufmann,  Kraay  model,  fraction of population
and Zoido-Lobaton  speaking English,  fraction of
(2002)  population speaking major
European language
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi  Real GDP Per Capita  Rule of Law from  Trade/GDP  in current Trade predicted by gravity  Distance from equator
(2002), Table 2, middle panel  at PPP,  1995  Kaufmann,  Kraay  local currency  units  model, Settler mortality
and Zoido-Lobaton
23Table 2 - DolGar-Kraay  (2002) Specification
2.1 -- Institutions Only  i  2.2  --  Trade  Only  23 - Institutions and Trade
fEndogenoius  RHS  Vanables  Institutions  rad  !  nstrti&oni  F  Tr-_  Insti ution  J7rd
O0Ls  and- iV Estimates
'OLS  l  0  985  I  g  1  1077  0 792  0 405
(0044)  1  0(B8)  (0.075)  (D.102)
,-.  I 
IIV  1  310  1.258  0 178
(0.141)  95
'Included Exogenous Variables  Inpop  Inpop
'First-Stage  Regressions  I
Ln(FrankelRomer)  0386  0.643  468
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  I  |  @9)  |(0.122)  O  (.J0
Engfrac  0  86.  0  944  0 368
(0.356)  Ii0348)  )292)
Eurfrac  0.500  0.691  0 363
E  -~~~~~~  ~~~~ i  ~~~  (0.247)  I  I  @  '2i)  |  @1681)
F-Statistic  13.350  2800  13.540  1i770
R-Squared  0.139  0285  0d6  1  0  342 ~~~~~~~  I  f  j  i 
I  #Observations  134  134  134
iWeak Instrument Diagnositics j
1shea Partiai R-Squared  i  0 139  i  .285  0039  02
ICorr(Fitted  Values)  0.740
iEigqnvalues  of r  l  0 025, 2 239
1Eigenvaluesof'  27191
195%  Confidence Intervals
Wald  (D5  7.1.9  51);  (-1.00,1.35)
AR  ;  I  (.w!Z)  ,  (~.wi)
'LR  E:|  (.)  ¢  sXm
Note:  Dependent variable in all specifications is  In(Real GDP per capita at PPP) in 1995.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
24Table  3 - Rodrik, Subramanian  and  Trebbi (2002)  Specifications
3.1  - Institutions and  Trade  3.2 - Institutions and Trade
LC Trade  Share  PPP Trade  Share
Endogenaus RHS Variables  Institutions  Institutlons  Trde
OLS  and  IV Estimates
'OLS  0 745  0 259  0 548  0 474
'(109)  (O  161)  (0115)  (0101)
IV  2 126  -0  513  2  880  -0  909
([1.S89)  (0.420)  (1 261)  (0  972)
Included Exogenous  bISTEO  OISTEQ
Vana bles
;First-Stage  Regressions
Ln(FrankelRomer)  0222  b  86  0222  0 491
(  0104)  (0057)  (0104)  (0110)
Engfrac
',Eurfrac
|  LnSetMor  -0 264  -0.133  -0  264  -0 212
t  -Stat;stic  17D00FO  3b 130  17.000  8 030
'  R-Squared  b 413  0594  0 413  0 284
#  Observations  E0  72
,Weak  Instrument  Diagnostics
,Shea  Partial  P-Squared  0110  b 324  0 052  0 083
fCarr(Frtted  Values)  0 202  0 667
IEigenvalues  of  I  0035s  447  0015,0380
|Eigenvalues  of r  6273, 40 834  1 792,13 210
i95Y  Confidence  Intervais
Wald  (0 95,  3  3)  (-1  35, 0 33)3  (  34, 5.33)  (-2 E51  03)
}  AR  (1 44, 7 86  (-3  81. 0 15)  ,  -7 2b)Uti  U  9.-)  (,012)9U(5  83,-)
t  LR  (1.44, 7  36)  (-4 14, 0 15)  ,-,-7.26) U (1 79,-)  (-@,  0 28) U (J83,)
S  &-@  -i 7i) U (1  67,)  &  (-,  -0 i8)  (-,0 20) U t2 32,1m)  (  (,2  - 11)  U (1 07,
Note:  Dependent variable in all specifications is In(Real GDP per capita at PPP) in  1995.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
25Table 3, cont'd - Rodrik, Subramanian  and Trebbi (2002) Specifications
3.3 - Institutions and Trade  3.4 - Institutions and Trade
-~  LC Trade  Share  LC Trade  Share, Add Area
Adddogenoi~s  Area,/anabIes  Poe)  Pop.  Tropics  Frost,  Malaria
*Endbqenovs  RHS Vanabbes  Ins1d4tions  ICd  nst  utiDns
iOLS and  IV  Estimates
IOLS  0.737  0 304  o.i79  0232
(0 i1)  O184)i  pi33)  (170
dIv  105o  0.351  15859  -0502
(0421  i(0  98)  (O  822)  ( 601)
oIncluded  Exogenous  DiSTEG  LNAEA, LNPOP  DISTEQ,  LNAREA,  LNPOP
IVanabIrs  TROPICS,  FROST.  MALARIA
Flist-Stage  Regressions
Ln(FrankelRomer)  - b 2  bi
-0  471  0 288  0 330  0 605
Engfrac  (0 249)  0:124)  t°  142)  t°088)
Eurfrac
LnSetMor  -0 lid  -- 104  -0202  -0063
(0 075)  ( 049)  (0 102)  0 065i)
F-Statistic  12.120  24 690  19.920  10 320
R-Squarad  0.481  0B62S  0.525  056
#  Observations  80  7n
'Weak Instrument Diagnostics
1Shea Partial R-Squared  0 169  0.089  006i2  0 196
Corr(Fitted  Values)  0  042  o  0oi
Eigenvalues  of il  01032, 0 315  0 021, 0 499
Eigevalues  of r  3.035, 9 708  3 148,  21  222
i95% Confidence  !nteFvals
Wald  98,  83)  (-1  62,2 32)  .0,3.30)  (1  70, 0.70)
AR  (i 04,4 31)  4l57 9 337)  (-=  -7 4)  U  (80,=)  (-.,  0.10)  U  (451,
LR  (1 04, 4 49)  (-4 57,11  02)  (--,-745)Ut080,-)  (--6 010)U(4  51,-)
S  (1  39,  i  (-c,e)  (m.)  (-=,  1.74) U (3.66, -)
Note:  Dependent variable in all specifications is ln(Real GDP per capita at PPP)  in 1995.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors  in parentheses.
26Table 4 - Decadal  Regressions from Dollar and  Kraay  (200?)
4.1  Trade Only  - 4.2 Institutions and Trade,  4.3  Institutions and Trade,
.EndoqenousR-PHS Vanable are  - institutionks;  Endogen-o-us  Institutions  Ex-ogenous;- 
Decade-verageGro~thin  -~Initial  Income  Trade  Initial Income  Trade  Institutions  Initial  Income  Trade~ 
O0LS  and  IV Estimates  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
--  ~~~~~~  ~  ~~(00567)  _(00  148)_  _(OSS§)  _(0_048)_  (02?23)  _(0_SS)__  (00P48)-
-0-732  --  -0249--  - -0649----  -02------06  -00632  ~  0 209_-
Uncluded  - - (0246)  ___  J1 108)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~90  Li~LA  7  (366)  (0107)p
Fn-uddExogenous  Variables  Decadal  dummies  Decadal  dummies  Decadal dummies,  Institutions
_ag_Rgressiorks
decade  of-
-nPeCpia0.004  0  1  010  01  0.002  - - 0.036  _  0.012
001  g  2  _  __  -0__  01  0__  _  _  _  ___  _2  __
IntTrade/GOP)  ~~~~~0.002  -0.014  0.001  .0 019  -0  001  0.0013  -0 018
--  ~~~~~~  ~~(0_00)  ~  (0_02)  _  )  (0002)  (0001)  (02)  --  (002)
nsi-4tutio-n's-  0034  0  021  -002___
--  - (0010)  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_(001)  (005)
F-Statistic  19 74  20.16  _  14 56  _17  79  12.39  12 94  _  19.04
R-Sa  uared  0.215  0.272  0 252  0 347  0 273  0.238  0.344
#bservations  27  __  ___  93  193
Wea  fIstrument  D  a  gn  _  __  __  __  __  __cs__  --  --  - --  - - _  _--  _
Se  a_-P-a-r,t!a-  PR--S-q  u-a-re-d  _0_  0053  42  7  --------  -0-0-0-5  0-  01  03 
---  --  r12-025, r13~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ll  006,  r23~:-0  12  --  -0.29
~E-ienvlues  oal  00M,002.003  1  xlDE-6, 0.0004, 0002  0 00002, 0.0005
7718.43934  ~~~~--  --  0.169-. 18759.5-.-527  36,3.7
45~( Confidencie  iinteivals  - -----  ----
Wia-ld-  -(0.2-5-,1-22)  0040)  4(-1243)0  0.45)  --- 3 47  6)1  55)  0,  042?)
- S  - (fl2~~~~~~~~~~3.)  (.4. 046)  i~~  4
Note:  Dependent variable is decadal average annual growth.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.Figure 1:  Confidence Sets Based on AR Statistic
C13~~.......  ......  13.1
. . . . . ~~~~~~~11.53
. . - 'tr  W  .t  N  r.  32  NO
. . . . . =  =|i  =~~~~~~~~~6.71  co




|  |  =  1  E  -~~~~~~~6.13
. |  |  - 7  . 73~~~~~-.7
>  l  .l  ~  . ..............  !1iUl!!lil|lUll!llii -9.34





gg  gg49~~~~499 0
3.63  .2
2 28  c
0.92  °
~~~~~~0  ~~~~~~~044  i
- 1  . 80  t~~~~~~~~~-18
g  g  gWt  ~~~~~~~~~3.15
-5.87~~~~~~~~~~~58
¢  '  N  G  N  B  ,  ~~~~~~~-7.23 c  0  CD 04  NO)  0)  c  Djt  CN  0C  °N
ON~  In  C4 o~  (p  on Trade











-15  -10  -5  0  5  10  15
29Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2983  Telecommunication  Reform in Ghana  Luke  Haggarty  March 2003  P Sintim-Aboagye
Mary M Shirley  37644
Scott Wallsten
WPS2984  Finance and Income  Inequality  George Clarke  March 2003  P Sintim-Aboagye
Test of  Alternative  Theories  Lixin Colin  Xu  37644
Heng-fu Zou
WPS2985  The Impact of Minimum  Wages on  Vivi Alatas  March  2003  T  Mailei
Employment  in a Low Income  Lisa Cameron  87347
Country.  An Evaluation Using the
Difference-in-Differences  Approach
WPS2986  Government  Bonds  in Domestic and  Stijn Claessens  March 2003  E Khine
Foreign  Currency. The Role of  Daniela  Klingebiel  37471
Macroeconomic  and  Institutional  Sergio Schmukler
Factors
WPS2987  East Asia's Dynamic Development  Ho-Chul Lee  March 2003  L James
Model  and the Republic of Korea's  Mary  P McNulty  35621
Experiences
WPS2988  Trade Facilitation and Economic  John S. Wilson  March 2003  P Flewitt
Development  Measuring the Impact  Catherine L Mann  32724
Tsunehiro  Otsuki
WPS2989  Decentralization and Public Services  Peyvand  Khaleghian  March 2003  H.  Sladovich
The Case of Immunization  37698
WPS2990  Ways  Out of Poverty.  Diffusing  Best  Michael Klein  March 2003  F Shah
Practices and Creating  Capabilities-  84846
Perspectives  on Policies for  Poverty
Reduction
WPS2991  Tenure Security and  Land-Related  Klaus  Deininger  March 2003  M Fernandez




WPS2992  Market and Nonmarket Transfers of  Klaus Deininger  March 2003  M Fernandez
Land in Ethiopia  Implications for  Songqing  Jin  33766
Efficiency, Equity, and  Nonfarm  Berhanu Adenew
Development  Samuel Gebre-Selassie
Mulat Demeke
WPS2993  Dealing with the Coffee Crisis in  Panos Varangis  March 2003  P Varangis
Central  America:  Impacts and  Paul Siegel  33852
Strategies  Daniele  Giovannucci
Bryan  Lewin
WPS2994  Options for  Financing  Lifelong  Miguel  Palacios  March 2003  E James
Learning  31756
WPS2995  Commodity  Market  Reform in Africa  Takamasa Akiyama  March 2003  P. Kokila
Some Recent Experience  John  Baffes  33716
Donald F Larson
Panos VarangisPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2996  Bank Competition,  Financing  Thorsten  Beck  March 2003  K. Labrie
Obstacles, and Access  to Credit  Asl1  DemirgOu-Kunt  31001
Vojislav  Maksimovic
WPS2997  Financial  and  Legal Institutions  Thorsten  Beck  March 2003  K. Labrie
and Firm  Size  Asl1  Demirguq-Kunt  31001
Vojislav  Maksimovic
WPS2998  Does Micro-Credit  Empower Women?  Mark M. Pitt  March 2003  P. Kokila
Evidence from  Bangladesh  Shahidur R.  Khandker  31001
Jennifer Cartwright
WPS2999  Explaining Liberalization  Philipp Harms  March 2003  P.  Flewitt
Commitments  in Financial  Aaditya  Mattoo  32724
Services  Trade  Ludger Schuknecht
WPS3000  International  Climate  Regime beyond  Franck Lecocq  March 2003  V  Soukhanov
2012: Are Quota Allocations  Rules  Renaud Crassous  35721
Robust to  Uncertainty?
WPS3001  An Introduction to Financial and  Antonio  Estache  March 2003  G. Chenet-Smith
Economic  Modeling for  Utility  Martin Rodriguez Pardina  36370
Regulators  Jose Mar[a Rodriguez
German  Sember
WPS3002  Information-Based  Instruments for  Uwe Deichmann  March 2003  Y  D'Souza
Improved  Urban Management  Somik V Lall  31449
Ajay Sun
Pragya Rajoria
WPS3003  The  Investment Climate and the  Mary Hallward-Driemeier  March  2003  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Firm:  Firm-Level  Evidence from China  Scott Wallsten  37644
Lixin  Colin Xu